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1 Introduction
In 2013, the European Union (EU) expenditure budget was around 149 billion
euro, with cohesion and agricultural and environmental resources being the main
EU policies, with respective shares of 46.8% and 39.8%. Due to the magnitude
of these figures, the budget allocation and the distribution among countries and
sections emerge as significant issues, which are crucial to analyze past decisions
and more importantly, they also help to predict future decisions. In this paper we
examine how the budget in the EU is allocated among different EU countries. We
also analyze the relative weights of different factors when it comes to explain the
budget shares corresponding to each EU country member.
Previous literature (Courchene et al., 1993; Anderson and Tyers, 1995; Tanger-
mann, 1997; Kandogan, 2000; Kauppi and Widgre´n, 2004, 2007) has tested two
alternative explanations of the EU budget distribution across the members’ states.
The first one is a ‘needs view’ of the budget, where members’ allocations are deter-
mined by principles of solidarity. According to this hypothesis, the countries with a
high weight of agriculture sector and/or a relative worse economic situation emerge
as the most important recipients of the EU budget. In fact, some of the previous
studies focused exclusively on this dimension (Courchene et al., 1993; Anderson
and Tyers, 1995; Tangermann, 1997). The second one is that budget allocation
across the members is reflected by the distribution of their political power, eval-
uated by traditional measures such as Shapley-Shubik power index. Thus, those
countries with higher power in the allocation process could get extra shares of the
EU budget. Thus, some studies combines both needs and power views (Kandogan,
2000; Kauppi and Widgre´n, 2004, 2007; Aksoy, 2010). The empirical analysis of
Kauppi and Widgre´n (2004) shows strong prevalence of political power motives.
Their results indicate that political power have higher weight than needs in the
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determination and allocation of budget expenditures among member states.
Our main purpose is to discuss the analysis of Kauppi and Widgre´n (2004),
which is based on 1976-2001 data on the patterns of the EU budget shares and
in the measures of each member state’s needs and the political power (expressed
by Shapley-Shubik index). We compare their results with the predictions based
on another power measure, the nucleolus, which has been argued as being an
appropriate power measure in distributive situations as well as an alternative to
traditional measures as the Shapley-Shubik index1.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First of all, a brief introduction on the EU
budget is presented, describing the process to design and allocate EU expenditures
and revenues. Second, we discuss the theoretical properties of different power
indexes frequently used in the previous literature. In this respect, the nucleolus
emerges as a power measure with several advantages with respect to other indexes.
Finally, a simple empirical model is specified, in order to find out the key-drivers
for budget allocation. The paper concludes summarizing the main findings and
some policy implications.
2 EU budget: procedure and evolution
As it was mentioned in the Introduction, the EU expenditure budget represents a
significant amount of resources. In 2013, total expenditures come to 148,468 million
euro. Although it is not a substantial amount in relative terms (1.13% of the 27
members Gross National Income, GNI ), there are some crucial policies which
are developed using the EU funding, such as the Common Agricultural Policy
(nowadays part of a more extensive section on the preservation and management of
natural resources) or several policies oriented towards the economic development of
1For example, Montero (2005), Montero (2013) and Le Breton et al. (2012) among others.
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some target regions (cohesion and competitiveness policies). Each country member
has also to contribute to the EU budget, basically by means of GNI-based (74.3%)
and VAT-based own resources (9,5%) and traditional own resources (TOR, 10.4%).
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the EU expenditure from 1976 to 2011. This
budget trend could be interpreted as a shot where the history of EU integration
and several budgetary reforms were simultaneously captured. Regarding the en-
largement process, there are some significant facts which could have impact on the
EU expenditures evolution. Among others, in 1986, the EU is extended from 10
to 12 countries, with the integration of Portugal and Spain as new members. In
a similar way Austria, Finland and Sweden were added to the EU/EC in 1995.
Additionally, one of the largest extensions happened in 2004, when the EU grew
from 15 to 25 countries2.
Budget structure was also aimed at successive EU reforms. In this respect there
are some facts which are worthy to mention. At the Brussels European Council
of February 1988, a political agreement was reached on doubling the budget of
the Structural Funds in real terms between 1987 and 1993. Subsequently, Mem-
ber States agreed at the Edinburgh European Council in December 1992 that
the budget for structural operations would be further increased, in particular for
the cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). Also in Edinburgh,
Member States decide to strengthen some particular policies, such as research and
development, external actions and financial aid to Central and Eastern European
countries. Although there were several agreements setting budgetary limits to
expenditure’s growth rate, the basis of a stringent budgetary discipline were es-
tablished at Agenda 2000 agreements. All those reforms have impact on the level
and the structure of budget expenditures, generating also some changes in the
2The new members were Check Republic, Cyprus, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Poland.
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Figure 1: EU expenditure bugdet: 1976-2011 (EU million)
Source: Own elaboration
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accounting system. Thus, the budget has experienced some structural reforms,
especially significant in 1992 and 2006.
Regarding the procedure for elaboration and approval of the EU budget, there
are several institutions which are involved. The European Commission, the Coun-
cil and the Parliament participates in the process of elaborating the EU budget.
However, during the last decades, the role of each institution and voting rules
have experienced several changes (Kauppi and Widgre´n, 2007). The relationship
between the Council and the Parliament was difficult until 1992 at the Edinburgh
meeting, where an Interinstitutional Agreement between both institutions was set,
in order to facilitate the process of making budgetary decisions.
The budget elaboration process consists of different steps. First of all, and based
on the multiannual financial framework in force and the budget guidelines for the
coming year, the European Commission prepares a preliminary draft budget. In
this stage, there are some spending priorities and also some caps or ceilings to limit
the maximum growth rate of different budgetary sections and the total budget.
Once a preliminary draft is elaborated, the European Commission submits it
to the Council and the Parliament. The budgetary authority, comprised of both
institutions, amends and adopts the draft budget. The Council should adopt its
position on the preliminary draft budget proposed by the Commission and elab-
orate and approve a definitive draft budget. Next, the Parliament could modify
the draft, adopting its amendments on the Council’s position, or proposing some
amendments on particular expenses. The final document proposed should be ap-
proved by simple majority by the Parliament. Afterwards, the Council should give
a second reading of the document, adopting it by a stronger majority then the
one required at the Parliament level3. A second reading by the Parliament and a
3Usualy, at least a qualified majority is required to adopt budgetary decisions at the Council
level.
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definitive adoption should finish the process.
So, it is clear that, although the Parliament role has increased in the last years4,
the approval procedure during the period analyzed in this research (1976-2001) and
the qualified majority required at the Council to approve the final EU budget leads
to consider the voting decisions of this institution (Kauppi and Widgre´n, 2004).
3 Power indices: the nucleolus versus the Shapley-
Shubik index
In recent decades there is growing literature, both theoretical and applied, on
power measures. However, there is no consensus on what is the best way to mea-
sure power. While analyzing the distribution of the EU budget among different
countries, previous studies have applied the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) (Kauppi
and Widgre´n, 2004), one of the mostly used power measures in the literature. In
contrast, in this study we apply an alternative measure, the nucleolus (Schmeidler,
1969). In what follows we provide strong arguments supporting our choice, and
in the subsequent section, we compare performance of the two indices in practice,
and analyze whether the conclusions of Kauppi and Widgre´n (2004) are robust
with respect to the choice of the power index.
The general discussion on which power measure is the best and which properties
it should possess remains open. Thus, Napel and Widgre´n (2004) divide existing
studies on power indices into two “disjoint methodological camps”, and propose
to take a unified framework linking them: “On the one hand, such framework
4The Treaty of Lisbon extended the role of Parliament. It was signed by the EU member
states on 13 December 2007, and entered into force on 1 December 2009. From that moment,
European Parliament could decide on both compulsory and non-compulsory expenses, extending
its power and responsibilities in the budget elaboration.
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should allow for predictions and ex post analysis of decisions based on knowledge
of procedures and preferences. On the other hand, it must be open to ex ante
and even completely a priori analysis of power when detailed information may
either not be available or should be ignored for normative reasons”. We address
the discussion in a specific distributional setting: an allocation of a fixed budget
across the members of an organization with the key assumption on preferences
that each member cares only about her own share.
Following Napel and Widgre´n (2004) let us consider two requirements in turn.
First, the power measure should be based on the explicit decision-making proce-
dures and the knowledge of the preferences. To this end, it is important that the
political analysis takes into account game forms. In this respect, both the SSI and
the nucleolus, are suitable measures to analyze bargaining situations such as the
distribution of the EU budget. Each of two measures has foundations in a non-
cooperative framework in a sense that any of them arises as a payoff from a well-
specified bargaining game. For instance5, Gul (1989) constructs a non-cooperative
game mimicking bargaining process in the markets. One of the main results state
that the payoffs associated with efficient equilibria converge to the agents’ Shapley
values as the time between periods of the dynamic game goes to zero. As for the
nucleolus, it appears as the vector of expected payoffs in the legislative bargaining
game with random proposers due to Baron and Ferejohn (1989), in which voters
directly make proposals and vote over division of a budget. If proposal probabili-
ties coincide with the nucleolus, then the nucleolus is the unique vector of expected
payoffs (Montero, 2006). The equality of the expected payoffs to the nucleolus also
hold for other proposal probabilities depending on the voting game.
According to the second requirement one would not want the power analysis to
5Other examples are Laruelle and Valenciano (2008), Laruelle and Valenciano (2001) and
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).
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be extremely sensitive to the details of the game form used to describe the non-
cooperative decision process. In the following paragraphs we show that only the
nucleolus passes this test.
In order to encompass the idea of robust and detailed-free power measure in our
specific distributional framework, we address the bargaining set, a solution concept
for coalitional games (Maschler et al., 2013). The idea behind the bargaining set
is that when the players decide how to divide the worth of the coalition, the player
who is not satisfied with the proposed share may object to it. The objection goes
against another player, claiming this player to share his part with the objecting
one. The player against whom the objection is made may have (or not) a counter
objection. An objection which does not have a counter objection is called justified.
The bargaining set consists of all imputations in which no player has a justified
objection against any other player.
It seems that the bargaining set describes well the decision-making procedure
in the EU institutions (see Section 2). On top of that, one of the nice properties
of the bargaining set is that contrary to the core it is never empty. However,
often the bargaining set is large, and then one faces the problem of choosing a
unique outcome in it. In such cases the nucleolus is a good candidate, since it
always exists, it is unique and it belongs to the bargaining set. On the contrary,
in general the Shapley value is not in the bargaining set. The following example
supports this argument. Let us consider three individuals with individual 1 being
a vetoer. This means that a decision is passed only when player one is present in a
group voting for the decision, however being alone she/he cannot get the decision
passed. In such a situation the core, the nucleolus and the bargaining set coincide
and attribute the whole surplus to player 1. On the contrary, the Shapley-Shubik
index is (2/3, 1/6, 1/6). One may check that under the distribution according to
the Shapley-Shubik index, player one has an objection. For example, he/she can
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offer player two to share the part of player three. In this setting player one has a lot
of power, and only one extra vote is needed to validate. The nucleolus models the
process of Bertrand competiotion between player two and three. To summarize,
both the SSI and the nucleolus have foundations in non-cooperative bargaining
games, which make them suitable for ex post political analysis. However, only the
nucleolus satisfies the requirement of being detailed-free measure open to an ex
ante analysis of the distributive situations. Given our specific framework, these
arguments allow us to favor the nucleolus versus the SSI in the empirical analysis
of the EU budget distribution. In the Appendix we provide the formal definitions
for the SSI and the nucleolus, as well as the figures for both power measures for
the period 1973-2001 taken from Le Breton et al. (2012).
3.1 Example
In this subsection we provide computations of the SSI and the nucleolus for the first
EU Council of Ministers (1958 - 1972). During that period the Council consisted
of the representatives of 6 countries: three “big” countries as Germany, Italy and
France held 4 votes each, two “medium” countries as Belgium and Netherlands
held 2 votes each and a “little” country, Luxembourg held 1 vote. A qualified
majority was set at 12 out of 17, i.e., in order to pass a decision it was necessary
to have at least 12 votes in favour of the decision. As was highlighted by many
studies6, Luxembourg was powerless in such a situation. Since other member states
held an even number of votes, Luxembourg formally was never able to make any
difference in the voting process.
The results are summarized in the following table.
According to the nucleolus a “medium” country receives twice as much as a
“big” country. This is quite intuitive, since in a minimal winning coalition a
6For example, Felsenthal and Machover (1997), among others.
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Table 1: The Council of Ministers (1958 - 1973).
Country weights SSI Nucl
Germany 4 0.233 0.250
Italy 4 0.233 0.250
France 4 0.233 0.250
Belgium 2 0.150 0.125
Netherlands 2 0.150 0.125
Luxembourg 1 0 0
Quota 12
Total votes 17
Quota (%) 70.59
“big” country can be replaced by two “medium” ones. Such substitutability often
holds for the nucleolus in contrast to other power indices, but it does not hold in
all cases7. As a consequence, the nucleolus treats all minimal winning coalitions
equally in this case: it prescribes the total “wealth” for both types of coalitions as
being equal 0.75. In contrast, according to the SSI the minimal winning coalitions
of the first and the second type get different amount, 0.766 and 0.7 respectively.
We would like to point out another interesting feature of the nucleolus. In 1973,
as compared to 1958, the “big” countries get the same power according to the
nucleolus. However, other countries, even though they are not dummies, get zero.
This is impossible for SSI or other power indices, but it is not unusual for the
nucleolus8. As a result, the nucleolus is very different from SSI and other indices
7for more detailed discussion see, for example, Montero (2005).
8see, for example, Montero (2005)
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in this example9.
4 Empirical Application
4.1 Data and empirical model
As it was explained at the introduction, this research is aimed at the identification
of significant key-drivers and trends of the EU budget allocation. In order to make
a robust comparison with the empirical model proposed by Kauppi and Widgre´n
(2004), the sample includes observations for the same period which was used by
the authors: 1976-2001. This period covers different stages in the EU composition:
from 1976 to 1980 (EU-9), from 1981 to 1985 (EU-10), from 1986 to 1995 (EU-12)
and from 1995 to 2001 (EU-15).
In this respect, a general and basic model will be proposed, where the budget
share on the whole EU budget of each country, depends on the aforementioned
index of political power, a set of variables representative of budgetary needs (pop-
ulation, economic activity indexes, etc.). The empirical model is presented as
follows:
bit = f(pit, Zit) + uit, (1)
9Both SSI and the nucleolus exhibit the paradox of new members: a member state’s relative
power increases although its relative weight decreases after the accession of the new members
(see for example, Felsenthal and Machover (1998)). An occurrence of the paradox is indicated by
an asterisk in the table in the appendix. One can notice that for SSI it happens for Luxembourg,
Denmark and Ireland. Luxembourg gains in relative power three times: from 0 to 0.001 - in
1973, from 0.001 to 0.03 - in 1981, and from 0.012 to 0.02 - in 1995. Denmark and Ireland both
gain in their relative power from 0.03 to 0.043 in 1986. For the nucleolus the paradox appears in
1986 for Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland and Greece, and in 1995 - for Luxembourg.
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where bit is the percentage of the total EU expenditure budget allocate to each
country in the year t, pit is an index of political power for each country and period,
and Zit is a vector of factors representatives of countries’ needs in each period.
Finally, uit represents the error term.
We have used three alternative specifications of dependent variable. With the
first two indexes, we are following the procedure proposed by Kauppi and Widgre´n
(2004). On the one hand, we consider the total expenditure budget share that each
country gets in the negotiation process (exp). On the other hand, an alternative
variable is defined, introducing an adjustment to take into account the UK’s budget
rebate10 (expadj). On top of that, we consider the difference between expenditures
and contributions in percentual terms(balance
We also consider some of the original variables from Kauppi and Widgre´n (2004)
as independent variables. in. First of all, two different alternatives to measure
political power discussed in the previous section are included into the analysis
(pssi; pnucl). Additionally, needs are shown using a set of variables (Z): each coun-
try’s share of the total agricultural production (agri), and the ratio of each coun-
try’s GDP per capita and the EU wide GDP per capita (income). Finally, due to
the different size of member states, population is included as a control variable,
and expressed in thousand millions (pop). Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics
of the variables.
Although it is possible to observe that the average values for both SSI and
the nucleolus are really close, the latest index is showing higher dispersion levels.
Additionally, we observe that the average expenditure budget percentage perceived
10This rebate was a compensation get by UK government in 1985. The main reason for the
rebate was that a high proportion of the EU budget is spent on the Common Agricultural Policy
(or CAP), which benefits the UK much less than other countries as it has a relatively small
farming sector as a proportion of GDP. The compensation consists of reallocating some of the
original UK monetary contributions to be paid by the remaining member states
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
exp 0.0844 0.0626 0 0.2510
exp adj 0.0844 0.0623 0 0.2510
balance 0.0041 0.0465 -0.1817 0.1274
p ssi 0.0844 0.0501 0.0010 0.1790
p nucl 0.0843 0.0779 0 0.25
agri 0.0844 0.0807 0.0010 0.3380
income 1.0160 0.2393 0.5810 1.967
pop 0.0270 0.0253 0.0004 0.0820
is around 8%, while the balance is positive and around 0.4%, which means that, in
average, countries are receiving more resources than their contributions to the EU
budget. Finally, it is worthy to mention that high levels of dispersion are registered
for the three control variables included in the analysis. Thus, country members
are heterogeneous in terms of size and economic structure.
The following table shows the correlations among variables. Let us note that
population is highly correlated with both power indexes. Thus, multicolineality
issues could probably emerge. However, dropping population from the analysis
could lead to generate an ommited variables problem. As we will show later, in
order to detect significant changes in the estimated coefficients, we have opted by
including two separate estimates including and excluding pop variable.
4.2 Results
In order to carry out some sensitivity analysis, we have specified six different
models, and for each one, we applied four different econometric techniques and
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two different scenarios. Estimates are presented in Tables 3 to 10. The six models
are the result of combining three different dependent variables (exp in Models (1)
and (3); expadj in Models (2) and (4); balance in Models (3) and (6)) with two
different political power indexes (pssi in Models 1 to 3; pnucl in Models (4) to (6)).
Regarding the econometric techniques, we include a pooled ordinary least squares
specification (OLS, Tables 3 and 4), to compare it to some panel data methodolo-
gies, such as fixed effects (FE, Tables 5 and 6) and random effects (RE, Tables 7
and 8). Finally, we also present adjusted random effects (REadj, Tables 9 and 10),
since we detected some autocorrelation problems. For convenience, the majority of
tests to compare models and detect econometric problems are reported in Tables
7 and 8. On top of that, we consider two different scenarios, including (Tables 4,
6, 8, and 10) and excluding pop variable (Tables 3, 5, 7, and 9), in order to check
the robustness of our findings11.
The results show some general facts which are observed in the majority of cases.
First of all, the specifications where the dependent variable is the expenditure
budget share (with or without adjustments) perform better. Those models whose
dependent variable is the balance between expenditures and revenues are weaker
in terms of explanatory power. Secondly, both power and needs matter in get-
ting extra resources. Thus, the higher political power is, the higher the expendi-
ture/balance share is. Those countries with higher agricultural activity and lower
relative income emerge as the beneficiaries of the EU policies, so they receive higher
shares of the whole budget. However, the weight of political power is lower in the
case of taking the nucleolus, while needs’ indexes become more important. Defini-
tively, political power matters, but not as much as the models which consider the
11Additional estimates were made, including some temporal dummies related to some historical
facts (the fall of Berlin wall, or the EU enlargements). However, they did not emerge as significant
factors to explain the budget/balance shares.
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Table 3: Estimates using OLS, excluding population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exp exp adj balance exp exp adj balance
p ssi 0.539** 0.774** -0.585**
p nucl 0.208** 0.295** -0.184**
agri 0.407** 0.255** 0.142* 0.534** 0.439** -0.027
income -0.025** -0.021** -0.093** -0.039** -0.041** -0.077**
cons 0.030** 0.019** 0.136** 0.061** 0.064** 0.100**
N 308 308 308 308 308 308
r2 0.88 0.88 0.31 0.86 0.84 0.25
F 733.89** 720.23** 45.78** 618.12** 513.32** 34.35**
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
SSI have shown. So the models based on nucleolus show a more balanced situation
between power and needs.
In general, the inclusion of pop variable into the analysis does not lead to signif-
icant changes. Althought there is a high correlation among population and other
variables, the problem has not important consequences. However, the gain in terms
of information/explanation is not much higher, except in the case of Models (3)
and (6), where balance is considered as dependent variable.
The analysis presented in the current paper suggests unobservable heterogeneity,
due to the strong differences among country members from different points of view.
Thus, the panel data methodologies lead to significant efficiency improvements in
this context. Tables 5 to to 10 show the results obtained under different panel data
techniques. Actually, Breusch and Pagan test for random effects reported in Tables
7 and 8 concludes that panel data models are preferred to pooled OLS model. In
Tables 5 and 6, fixed effects models are presented. We observe significant changes
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Table 4: Estimates using OLS, including population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exp exp adj balance exp exp adj balance
p ssi 0.506** 0.668** 0.078
p nucl 0.149** 0.195** 0.048
agri 0.401** 0.237** 0.256** 0.462** 0.318** 0.255**
income -0.026** -0.024** -0.079** -0.038** -0.040** -0.080**
pop 0.088 0.284* -1.778** 0.445** 0.758** -1.760**
cons 0.031** 0.024** 0.104** 0.059** 0.061** 0.107**
N 308 308 308 308 308 308
r2 0.88 0.88 0.47 0.87 0.86 0.47
F 549.71** 549.76** 66.97** 493.07** 455.89** 67.21**
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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Table 5: Estimates using FE, excluding population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exp exp adj balance exp exp adj balance
p ssi 0.752** 0.646** 0.230*
p nucl 0.221** 0.170** 0.095**
agri 0.143* 0.208** 0.144* 0.258** 0.323** 0.157*
income -0.000 0.002 0.010 -0.019+ -0.014 0.004
cons 0.009 0.011 -0.038** 0.063** 0.057** -0.021+
N 308 308 308 308 308 308
r2 o 0.85 0.87 0.13 0.85 0.83 0.11
F 52.20** 48.96** 8.21** 36.50** 34.11** 8.54**
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
in the value of the coefficients, but not in the sign, which remains robust.
Basic random effects models are presented in the tables below. Hausman test
results leads to identify random effects model as a preferred alternative in some
cases, especially when explaining expenditure budget shares adjusted to the UK
rebate, and population is used as an additional control variable.
In Tables 9 and 10 (and also in OLS estimations), it is possible to observe that
random effect models adjusted by autocorrelation keep showing the higher weight
of the SSI variable when the UK’s rebate correction is implemented. In models (4)
(5) and (6), which consider the nucleolus, the majority of variables are significant,
and chi-2 test shows better results than in the models where the SSI was included
and autocorrelation was corrected, specially when population is included into the
analysis. Moreover, comparing with previous estimates, more coefficients are now
significant. Additionally, note again that power index coefficient is not so high
as in the previous estimates, reflecting the lowest value of all the estimates and
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Table 6: Estimates using FE, including population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exp exp adj balance exp exp adj balance
p ssi 0.771** 0.656** 0.164+
p nucl 0.216** 0.163** 0.075*
agri 0.166* 0.220** 0.068 0.238** 0.292** 0.070
income 0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.020+ -0.016 -0.000
pop 0.361 0.182 -1.195* -0.280 -0.443 -1.223*
cons -0.006 0.003 0.013 0.074** 0.074** 0.025
N 308 308 308 308 308 308
r2 o 0.85 0.87 0.29 0.81 0.74 0.29
F 39.21** 36.64** 7.38** 27.37** 25.73** 7.75**
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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Table 7: Estimates using RE, exluding population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exp exp adj balance exp exp adj balance
p ssi 0.740** 0.710** 0.153+
p nucl 0.217** 0.180** 0.088*
agri 0.256** 0.258** 0.087 0.426** 0.424** 0.076
income -0.009 -0.006 0.001 -0.027** -0.022* -0.003
cons 0.007 0.007 -0.014 0.054** 0.051** -0.003
N 308 308 308 308 308 308
r2 o 0.87 0.87 0.11 0.86 0.83 0.08
chi2 436.99 380.78 11.71 289.43 216.28 14.35
BreuschPagan t 18.22** 66.72** 930.91** 17.98** 145.04** 1122.37**
Hausman t 14.22** 8.91* 122.96** 29.18 ** 30.49** 68.87**
Wooldridge t 46.09** 47.18** 51.63** 24.17** 48.73** 50.46**
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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Table 8: Estimates using RE, including population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exp exp adj balance exp exp adj balance
p ssi 0.709** 0.674** 0.156+
p nucl 0.205** 0.185** 0.074*
agri 0.229** 0.235** 0.079 0.384** 0.379** 0.087
income -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.028** -0.021* -0.008
pop 0.300+ 0.361* -1.247** 0.588** 0.643** -1.192**
cons 0.003 0.001 0.022 0.045** 0.038** 0.030*
N 308 308 308 308 308 308
r2 o 0.86 0.87 0.33 0.86 0.85 0.33
chi2 420.97 371.50 35.92 493.87 300.38 37.33
BreuschPagan t 19.40** 68.42** 840.48** 16.75** 86.44** 834.71**
Hausman t 66.83** 3.42 11.73* 8.59+ 7.01 12.28*
Wooldridge t 46.08** 47.10** 46.58** 25.25** 48.43** 47.31**
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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Table 9: Estimates using RE adj, excluding population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exp exp adj balance exp exp adj balance
p ssi 0.626** 0.792** -0.001
p nucl 0.197** 0.251** 0.125+
agri 0.324** 0.213** -0.184* 0.506** 0.439** -0.286**
income -0.016 -0.013 -0.051** -0.035** -0.037** -0.042*
cons 0.019 0.012 0.072** 0.060** 0.063** 0.061**
N 308 308 308 308 308 308
chi2 454.59 461.27 18.96 474.31 435.13 17.94
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Table 10: Estimates using RE adj, including population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exp exp adj balance exp exp adj balance
p ssi 0.484** 0.585** 0.274+
p nucl 0.126** 0.150** 0.144*
agri 0.278** 0.144* 0.021 0.368** 0.244** 0.025
income -0.018 -0.016 -0.054** -0.032** -0.033** -0.060**
pop 0.489* 0.713** -1.421** 0.776** 1.090** -1.312**
cons 0.024+ 0.019 0.073** 0.054** 0.054** 0.086**
N 308 308 308 308 308 308
chi2 471.77 470.78 48.99 525.34 493.57 49.49
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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reinforcing the idea that the impact of political power on the budget shares is not
as important as Kauppi and Widgre´n (2004) predicted.
5 Discussion and future extensions
The main contribution of this paper focuses on finding out the role of political
power on the EU budget decisions. Some key-drivers of budget shares allocated to
each EU member country have been identified. Both power and needs are signifi-
cant factors which lead expenditure budget allocation at the European institutions.
Some previous empirical analysis (Kauppi and Widgre´n, 2004, 2007) have shown
strong prevalence of political power motives. Their results indicate that huge per-
centage of the budget expenditures can be attributed to selfish power politics,
leaving a small contribution to the declared benevolent EU budget policies based
on needs.
We propose an alternative power index based on Schmeidler (1969) research.
The nucleolus has emerged as the most adequate alternative in this context. On
the one hand, it performs better from a theoretical point of view, displaying some
nice properties. On the other hand, it is a significant factor when it comes to
explain the budget shares got by each EU country. We carry out an empirical
study using the same data set of Kauppi and Widgre´n (2004), using the different
alternative political power measures.
Our findings show that the model which considers the nucleolus fits better to
the data, showing higher values at global significance tests. On top of that, we
found that the relative weight of political power when explaining budget shares
is lower than other models’ predictions. Needs also matter, and countries with
lower relative income levels and higher weight of irrigation sector are recipients of a
significant amount of EU resources. These findings are consistent with the idea that
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the EU budget is allocated to develop key policies such as the common agricultural
policy and the structural funds. Although political power has impact on the EU
budgetary decisions, this impact is more moderate that previous literature has
estimated.
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Appendix 2
6.1 Technical preliminaries
In this section we introduce some basic notions commonly used to model voting
situations and then briefly discuss the nucleolus and the Shapley-Shubik index.
We consider a set N = {1, ..., n} of n players or voters, which is often referred as
an assembly. The power set 2N collects all the subsets of N . A non-empty subset
S ⊆ N is called a coalition. The coalition N is said to be the grand coalition.
A cooperative game with transferable utility in characteristic function form, is a
pair (N, v) with N the set of players and
v : 2N −→ R : S 7−→ v(S),
a map that satisfies v(∅) = 0. The map v is called the characteristic function. The
value v(S) is said to be the value or the worth of coalition S. For simplicity we
refer to these games as ”games in TU form”.
The game (N, v) is said to be simple if:
· the value of a coalition either 0 or 1: v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊆ N ,
· the value of grand coalition is 1: v(N) = 1.
A coalition with a value equal 1 is said to be winning, and a coalition with a value
equal 0 is said to be loosing. A winning coalition S is minimal if it does not contain
any other winning coalition: v(S) = 1 and v(T ) = 0 for all T ⊂ S. Further, the set
of winning coalitions is denoted by W and the set of minimal winning coalitions
is denoted by Wm. The simple game (N, v) is completely determined through the
pair (N,W).
Furthermore, the simple game is said to be monotonic if supersets of winning
coalitions are winning, i.e., if S ∈ W and T ⊃ S, then T ∈ W . A monotonic
simple game is also called a simple voting game.
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Very often voting situations are described by weighted majority games, for ex-
ample the one in the EU Council of Ministers. The game (N, v) is said to be a
weighted majority game if there exists an n-tuple w = (ω1, ..., ωn) of nonnegative
weights with ω1 + ω2 + ...+ ωn = 1 and a nonnegative quota q such that v(S) = 1
if and only if the total weight of the players in S exceeds the quota q, i.e.,
v(S) = 1 if and only if
∑
i∈S
ωi ≥ q.
The pair [q;ω] is called a representation of the game (N, v). Typical examples of
weighted majority games are:
· the majority game: w = (1, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) and q = (n+ 1)/2,
· the unanimity game: w = (1, 1, ..., 1) and q = n,
· the dictator game: w = (1, 0, 0, ..., 0) and q = 1 (player 1 is the dictator).
A measure of power is a map ξ from the set of simple voting game (N, v) to the
set of n-tuples of real numbers. The value ξi = ξi (N, v) is the power of player i in
the game (N, v) , and it satisfies 0 ≤ ξi ≤ 1.
6.2 Shapley-Shubik Index
One of the most famous power measures used in the literature is the Shapley-Shubik
indice12. There are several approaches to present and to interpret the Shapley-
Shubik index in the literature. Shapley and Shubik (1954) apply the following
scheme to introduce their index. The players vote in order and as majority is
reached the bill passes. The critical13 voter is assumed to get the credit for having
12For the definitions and the properties see for example, Felsenthal and Machover (1998).
13Player i in coalition S is said to be critical in S if without player i the coalition left behind
is loosing, i.e.
i is critical in S if i ∈ S ∈ W and S \ {i} /∈ W.
If i is not critical in any S ∈ W, then i is a dummy.
29
passed the bill. The index is then determined through the assumption of a random
voting order.
Let (N, v) be a simple voting game. The Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) of player
i is defined by
φi = φi(N, v) =S: i is critical in S
(|S| − 1)! (n− |S|)!
n!
for all i ∈ N . (2)
The advantage of this approach is that it is very simple and non-technical.
However, the authors emphasize the fact that this scheme “is just a convenient
conceptual device”. The main shortcoming of this scheme is that this voting model
cannot be considered realistic: there is no reason why the pivot should get all the
credit, or why the order of the grand coalition formation should matter14.
6.3 The Nucleolus
The nucleolus is a solution concept for cooperative games, which was first formu-
lated by Schmeidler (1969). In order to introduce it let us consider a characteristic
function game (N, v). For convenience, for some vector x we define:
x(S) ≡
∑
i∈S
xi for any S ⊆ N.
A payoff vector x = (x1, ..., xn) with xi ≥ v(i) and x(N) = v(N) is called an
imputation. We denote by X(N, v) the set of all imputations of the game (N, v).
Let x be an imputation, then for any coalition S the excess of S is defined as
e(S, x) = v(S)− x(S).
One may interpret this number as a measure of ”dissatisfaction” for coalition
S at imputation x. For any imputation x let S1, ..., S2n−1 be an ordering of the
14For more detailed discussion, see Felsenthal and Machover (1998).
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coalitions for which e (Sl, x) ≥ e (Sl+1, x) for l = 1, ..., 2n − 2. Let E(x) be the
vector of excess defined as El(x) = e (Sl, x) for all l = 1, ..., 2
n − 1. We say that
E(x) is lexicographically less than E(y) if:
El(x) < El(y) for the smallest l for which El(x) 6= El(y).
We denote this relation by E(x) ≺lexmin E(y).
The nucleolus is the set of imputations x for which the vector E(x) is lexico-
graphically minimal:
ν = ν(N, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) : @y ∈ X(N, v) : E(y) ≺lexmin E(x)} .
The following recursive procedure is used to characterize the nucleolus. By
definition E1 (x) is the largest excess of any coalition relative to x. At the first
step of the procedure we find the set X1 of all imputations x that minimizes E1 (x):
min 
s.t. e(S, x) ≤  for all S, ∅ ⊂ S ⊂ N
and x(N) = v(N)
.
The set X1 is called the least core of c. If it is not a unique point, we find the
set X2 of all x in X1 that minimizes E2 (x), the second largest excess and so on.
This process eventually leads to an Xk consisting of a single imputation, called the
nucleolus (Maschler et al. (1979), Schmeidler (1969)). The nucleolus minimizes
recursively the ”unsatisfaction” of the worst treated coalitions.
It appears that the nucleolus of a game in coalitional form exists and it is unique.
If the core is not empty, the nucleolus is in the core. Like the Shapley value the
nucleolus can be obtained as the unique value satisfying a set of axioms.
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